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Maintaining a Flexible Payout Policy in a Mature Industry:  
The Case of Crown Cork and Seal in the Connelly Era 
 
James Ang, Florida State University, and Tom Arnold, C. Mitchell Conover, and 
Carol Lancaster, University of Richmond 
Surveys of CFOs suggest that the desire for financial flexibility is among the most 
important considerations in deciding on corporate capital structure.1  And especially for 
companies with less predictable earnings and cash flow, limiting leverage and dividend 
payments is one way of maintaining financial flexibility.2  One of the disadvantages of 
cash dividends is that they effectively commit the firm to an indefinite series of future 
payouts.  Once a regular dividend has been established, managers are very reluctant to cut 
or eliminate them in the future. 
On the other hand, the fact that most mature firms pay cash dividends, and most 
pay them regularly, suggests that dividend payments play a valuable role in the 
economy.3  To the extent they represent a long-term commitment by management, 
dividends help even the informational playing field between management insiders and 
outside shareholders.4  And perhaps most important, cash dividends are a way of limiting 
the temptation and ability of corporate managers in mature businesses to waste “free cash 
flow”—cash generated by the business that cannot be profitably reinvested inside the 
firm.5 
But dividends are not the only way to return such free cash flow to shareholders.  
Stock repurchases offer several advantages over cash dividends as a way to accomplish 
the same task.  Perhaps most important, stock repurchases preserve flexibility since they 
do not commit the firm to a future payout level, and such flexibility is especially valuable 
when future profitability is uncertain.6  Stock repurchases also have the benefit of 
increasing the relative ownership stakes of managers who are also owners, thereby 
1 Graham, J.R. and Harvey, C.R., 2001. The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from the 
field. Journal of Financial Economics 60, 187-243 
2 DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., 2007. Capital Structure, Payout Policy and Financial Flexibility. Working Paper, USC Marshall School of Business.  Blau, B.M., Fuller, K.P., 2008. Flexibility and dividends. 
Journal of Corporate Finance 14, 133-152 
3 For comprehensive discussions of dividend policy and empirical evidence, see Ang, J., 1987. Do 
dividends matter? A review of corporate dividend theories and evidence. Monograph Series in 
Finance and Economics.   
4 Bhattacharya, S., 1979. Imperfect information, dividend policy, and the bird in the hand fallacy. Journal 
of Economics 10, 259-270.  John, K., Williams, J., 1985. Dividends, dilution, and taxes: a signaling 
equilibrium. Journal of Finance 40, 1053-1070.  Miller, M.H., Rock, K., 1985. Dividend policy 
under asymmetric information. Journal of Finance 40, 1031-1051. 
5 Rozeff, M., 1982. Growth, beta and agency costs as determinants of dividend payout ratios.  Journal of 
Financial Research 5, 249-259.  Easterbrook, F., 1984. Two agency-cost explanations of dividends. 
American Economic Review 74, 650-659. Jensen, M.C., 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, 
corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review 76, 323-329. 
6 Lie, E., 2005. Financial flexibility, performance, and the corporate payout choice. Journal of Business 78, 
2179-2202. 
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strengthening the alignment of interests between management and outside shareholders.7   
What’s more, a consistent repurchase policy sends important information to the stock 
market about what management believes, given that managers with much of their own 
wealth invested in the firm will not volunteer to overpay for shares.8  Finally, repurchases 
also offer benefits to shareholders by subjecting investors to a lower capital gains tax rate 
and allowing them to time their own taxable gains.9  
Despite all these advantages, however, it is difficult to show empirically that share 
repurchases are better for companies and their shareholders than regular cash dividends. 
Few companies have remained committed to a no-cash dividend policy for long time 
period.  And to demonstrate that it can be done for “the right reasons,” researchers need 
to find examples of companies whose no-dividend policies reflect the deliberate, 
unforced, long-term choices rather than the usual constraints that cause companies to 
suspend or fail to initiate dividend: namely, poor operating performance, high debt, or 
strong growth prospects with limited ability to raise outside capital. 
As related in these pages, the history of Crown Cork and Seal (hereafter known as 
“Crown”) provides us with a case of a company that stopped paying dividends but 
establish a disciplined share repurchase policy and did so for all the right reasons.  Under 
family ownership in the 1950s, Crown lost market share and was on the brink of 
bankruptcy when its largest shareholder, John Connelly, was elected chairman of the 
board in 1957.  Under John Connelly’s leadership, the firm restructured its operations and 
began a payout policy based solely on stock repurchases.  During the Connelly era, the 
firm did not pay a penny of common dividends, which is remarkable for a mature firm in 
a slow growth industry.10  Using share repurchases instead, Crown managed the agency 
and information problems that beset public companies with outside shareholders.   
In what follows, we show how a flexible payout policy can result in superior 
returns to shareholders over three decades.  When faced with declining prospects in its 
industry, Crown pursued a focused and disciplined growth strategy.  Crown’s high degree 
of managerial ownership resulted in more focused investments than the diversification 
strategies pursued by Crown’s competitors.11  To fund its acquisitions, the firm used 
7 Kahle, K., 2002. When a buyback isn't a buyback: open market repurchases and employee options. 
Journal of Financial Economics 63, 235-261. Allen, F., Michaely, R., 2003. Payout Policy. 
In Constantinides G., Harris, M., Stulz, R.  (Eds.), North-Holland Handbook of Economics; 
Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
8 Vermaelen, T., 1984. Repurchase tender offers, signalling and managerial incentives. Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis 19, 163-181. 
9 Constantinides, G.M., 1984. Optimal stock trading with personal taxes. Journal of Financial Economics 
13, 65-89.  
10 The duration of Crown’s no-dividend policy is unusual for NYSE firms.  Using CRSP data, there were 
4911 firms in total over the Connelly era.  Of these, 302 were listed for the entire period 1957-1990.  Of 
these 302, only four did not make any cash dividends during the entire period.  They are LVI Group, 
Publicker Industries, United Park City, and Crown Cork and Seal. 
11 This is consistent with findings elsewhere. See for example, Denis, D.J., Denis, D.K., Sarin, A., 1997a. 
Agency problems, equity ownership, and corporate diversification. Journal of Finance 52, 135-160. 
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internally generated cash flow, avoided external financing, and maintained very low 
levels of leverage.  Crown’s flexible financial policy allowed the firm to pursue value-
increasing investments that represent the legacy of the Connelly era (and whose payoffs 
are depicted graphically in Figure 1).   
 
Data 
The data for this study was collected from several sources.  The company’s financial 
statements were prepared using Compustat and company annual reports.  Proxy 
statements were obtained from the company and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to collect information on ownership, compensation, and board composition.   
Financial statement information on Crown’s three competitors and their lines of business 
were recorded from Compustat, Moody's Industrial Manual, and from their annual 
reports.  The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database was used to obtain 
common stock returns, dividends, stock prices, stock dividends, and stock splits.  Stock 
repurchase data were obtained from annual reports.  Compensation data for Crown and its 
competitors were obtained from Business Week and Forbes special issues on executive 
compensation.  The history of Crown was compiled using Crown annual reports, a 
Harvard Business School Case, Forbes and Fortune profiles, and other sources.12   
We examine Crown’s policies over the 33-year reign of its CEO, John Connelly. 
Connelly started as CEO in 1957 and stepped down in 1989.  He remained chairman of 
the board until early 1990. We used data from Crown and its competitors to judge the 
success of Crown’s policies.  But our comparative analysis of Crown and its competitors 
metal can industry ends in 1984,13 as those competitors either went private or were 
acquired by other firms.   
 
Early History  
William Painter founded the Crown Cork and Seal Company in 1892.  Its primary 
business was the manufacture of crowns (pop off bottle caps) and closures (screw off 
bottle caps).  Painter had invented a metal bottle cap with a cork seal that was known as a 
“crown cork.”  In 1927, Crown was merged with a firm owned by Charles McManus Sr.  
Crown flourished under McManus’s direction, expanding internationally and eventually 
producing half the bottle caps sold worldwide.  The company made an early entry into tin 
cans, which later became one of its principal products.  By the time McManus died in 
1946, he left a profitable and healthy company to his heirs.  
With the death of McManus, management of the company was passed on to John 
Nagle, a lawyer and McManus’s personal secretary.  McManus’s widow and his sons, 
12 The primary sources for the firm’s early history are: 1) Bower, Joseph L., 1972, Crown Cork and Seal 
Company and the Metal Container Industry, Harvard Business School Case Studies 373-077, 1-23; 2) 
Sturm, P.W.  “The Uncanny Can Company.” Forbes (September 17, 1979), 160,164; and 3) Whalen, R.J. 
“The Unoriginal Ideas That Rebuilt Crown Cork.” Fortune (October 1962),118-164. 
13 To provide an industry comparison over Connelly’s entire era, we also construct a can and bottle 
industry index for Figures 1 and 2.  
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Charles Jr. and Walter, retained a 25% ownership interest in the firm.  In the years 
immediately following World War II, the firm enjoyed a healthy market for its crowns 
due to increased demand for bottled beverages.  From 1945 until 1948, Crown’s net 
profits nearly doubled from $2.4 million to $4.5 million.   
During Nagle’s tenure, however, the company was poorly managed and beset by 
inefficiencies.  The company was divided along product areas, with the divisions 
frequently competing with each other.  Each factory was equipped with full accounting 
and finance staffs.  From 1953 to 1955, Crown added 385 managers to fill the roles 
required by the duplication of staff.  Mismanagement resulted both in falling company 
morale and profit margins. (Figure 2 shows the decline in operating efficiency, as 
measured by operating profit margin.) 
At the same time, the firm also faced external challenges.  Metal crown sales 
accounted for roughly half its sales and the firm had half the worldwide market for them.  
From 1939 to 1947, industry production of metal crowns increased at an average rate of 
22% a year.  As metal cans gained in popularity at the expense of glass bottles, the firm 
suffered, however.  From 1954 until 1958, the growth of metal crown production 
averaged only 0.7% a year while metal can production increased at about 10%.14  Crown 
had diversified into metal cans but that industry had low profit margins, thanks to the 
dominance of large, high volume competitors like American Can and Continental Can.  
Crown was a much smaller producer, with only an estimated 4% market share in 1961.  
Firm management made a strategic mistake in trying to copy the high volume, low 
margin strategy of its larger competitors. 
Scholars have found that when the management of a firm passes onto heirs, firm 
performance tends to suffer.15  And Crown was no exception:  Figure 1 shows a pattern 
of value reducing investments under family ownership during the early and mid-1950s.  
Crown’s risk-adjusted stock returns relative to competitors in the container industry fell 
steadily from 1951 to 1957.  By 1954, the company’s profit margin had fallen to 2% as 
operating expenses climbed to 13% of sales.   
A new president, Russell Gowans, was brought in to improve performance but 
Nagle retained the title of chairman and the McManus family still held majority 
ownership.  When Gowans asked permission to bring outsiders onto the board of 
directors, he was refused. 
 
The Restructuring 
By the first quarter of 1957, Crown’s poor operating performance created a cash crisis.  
The previous year’s earnings were not enough to pay the preferred dividends.  Crown 
sustained a first quarter loss of $600,000 and its bank withdrew credit.  Along with $2.5 
14 U.S. Census of Manufacturers. 
15 Cucculelli, M., Micucci, G., 2008.  “Family succession and firm performance: Evidence from Italian 
family firms,” Journal of Corporate Finance 14, 17-31. 
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million in debt called by its bank, Crown owed $4.5 million in short-term notes payable 
by the end of the year.  Its common stock was selling for half its book value.   
With the firm unable to make dividend and interest payments, the McManus 
family finally relented to Gowans and an outsider, John Connelly, was elected to the 
board in November 1956.  Connelly, previously a sales manager for Container 
Corporation of America, was promised business by Crown if he would start his own 
business.  In response, he formed Connelly Containers in 1945.  However, the Nagle 
regime that followed McManus Sr. did not honor the promise.  Despite being turned 
down, Connelly cultivated an interest in the company while building Connelly Containers 
and began buying Crown stock in 1955. As the depth of Crown’s problems became 
apparent to him, Connelly turned to his friend Robert Drummond, an investment banker, 
for information and advice.  Previously, they had attempted the takeover of the St. 
Lawrence Corporation together in 1951 and had failed.  At first the task of taking control 
of Crown seemed impossible to Connelly and Drummond, because so much of the stock 
was in family hands.  But as the firm’s financial condition worsened, support for 
Connelly grew amongst shareholders and customers.  By the time Connelly was elected 
to the presidency in April 1957, he was Crown's largest stockholder outside of the 
McManus family. 
When he assumed the presidency, Connelly immediately canceled all new 
purchasing orders.  In three months, Connelly liquidated $7 million in inventory and paid 
off all short-term debt without issuing any new debt.  He reduced long-term debt and 
repurchased 20,000 shares of preferred stock, saving $300,000 in fixed debt and preferred 
charges. Connelly cut headquarters staff from 160 to 80 and laid off 1647 employees 
(24% of the work force), reducing the payroll by $10 million.  He discarded the 
divisional corporate structure and replaced it with a lean, straight-line organization, 
avoiding duplication of sales and management efforts.  He eliminated inefficient 
materials handling and reduced production facilities from 53 multi-story buildings to 
three single-story buildings.  Connelly emphasized quality control by monitoring 
manufacturing variances.  Rigorous sales forecasting reduced overproduction and excess 
inventory.  Connelly dined with employees in the company cafeteria and consulted with 
line workers.  He visited plants throughout the United States and the world that had not 
seen a visitor from upper management in years.  He eliminated management limousines.  
Crown’s liquidity crisis subsided as efficient personnel and inventory management 
practices generated cash that had been squandered in the past. 
Connelly’s changes allowed Crown to succeed in a metal can industry that much 
larger competitors eventually abandoned.  In 1957, three companies bigger than Crown 
dominated the industry.  The two largest companies, Continental Can and American Can, 
had sales approximately nine times that of Crown, while National Can was closer in size. 
Despite Crown’s small size in 1957, Connelly’s policies eventually led to Crown's 
purchase of its largest competitor, Continental Can, in 1990.  Crown would ultimately be 
the only one of the four largest companies in 1957 to survive as an independent company. 
6 
 
One of Connelly’s most important new policies was replacing common dividends 
with a stock repurchase program.  Given the difficult industry conditions during his 
tenure, the flexibility of the stock repurchase program proved quite an advantage.16 
 
Payout Policy 
As Crown emerged from its liquidity crisis in 1958, the company began repurchasing its 
preferred and common stock.  Crown subsequently repurchased its preferred in every 
year except 1960 and retired it altogether in 1970.  
The firm repurchased common stock in 26 of the 32 years from 1958 to 1989, 
with the six exceptions occurring during the 1960s.17  Between 1957 and 1989, Crown 
retired $624 million of preferred and common stock, using 31% of the firm's operating 
cash flow during that time.  Figure 3 shows the amount of shares repurchased as a 
percentage of operating cash flow.  Consistent with financial theory,18 Crown appeared 
to increase its repurchases when high internal cash flow gave it flexibility to do so.  The 
firm’s cash flow statements show that cash flow from operations was by far the largest 
source of cash, at 77%, with the rest coming from debt and equity issuances and property 
sold.19  Cash flow from operations was especially strong in the mid-1980s when Crown 
repurchased shares heavily.  During 1957-1989, cash flow from operations totaled $2.1 
billion and was positive in every year. 
The repurchases provided Crown shareholders with a payout yield comparable to 
that of its dividend paying competitors.  Crown's repurchase policy during Connelly’s 
reign resulted in an average common yield, 4.7%, that was almost identical to the average 
of its competitors’ common dividend yield of 4.6%.  If one includes preferred stock 
repurchases and preferred dividend increases in the calculation, Crown’s payout yield 
increases to 5.7%.20  Additionally, the common payout yield under Connelly was greater 
16 Connelly’s decision to discontinue dividends appears to have been a conscious choice, and not the result 
of the firm's distress.  The company Connelly formed to do business with Crown, Connelly Containers, also 
shunned the payment of cash dividends. From 1948 until 1957, Connelly Containers paid no common cash 
dividends.  During 1958-1961, its common stock paid a dividend of just 10 cents on an average stock price 
of $5.38.  From 1962 until 1988 (the last year it was public), the company paid no cash dividends.  
Connelly Containers pursued an active repurchase program that resulted in the retirement of all preferred 
stock by 1962.  
17 In five of the six years that Crown did not repurchase common stock, the firm did repurchase preferred.  
Only in 1960 did the firm not repurchase any stock.  In Crown’s annual report, Connelly describes 1960 as 
“a year of challenge” due to increased material and labor costs as well as a decrease in sales attributed to 
increased competition. 
18 Lie, E., 2005. Financial flexibility, performance, and the corporate payout choice. Journal of Business 
78, 2179-2202. 
19 Similar to the methodology in Lie (2005), to arrive at the cash flow from debt, we use it in the 
summation of the total only when its net contribution is nonnegative.  
20 To determine the yield on Crown’s common stock, the annual dollar amount of common repurchases is 
divided by beginning of the year common capitalization.  When the preferred yield is included in the 
calculation, common and preferred repurchases as well as preferred dividends are divided by beginning of 
the year common and preferred capitalization. 
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than the common dividend yield under the Nagle regime, 3.9%.  Thus, Crown 
stockholders who chose to tender shares enjoyed cash distributions similar to that under a 
dividend program. 
Although aggregate yields may be similar, share repurchases result in more 
variable payments to shareholders than regular dividends do. But, as mentioned earlier, a 
repurchase program gives a firm several advantages over dividends. First, firms can do 
repurchases quickly and without creating an expectation that repurchases will continue in 
the same manner.21  For Crown, this flexibility was important, given that the growth 
prospects in its mature industry were very uncertain. The variability of cash flow spent on 
repurchasing stock in Figure 3 indicates that Crown used the flexibility inherent in stock 
repurchases.  In some years, Crown spent over half its operating cash flow on 
repurchases, while in other years very little.  By retiring all of its preferred stock, Crown 
also eliminated the fixed charges of the preferred dividend. 
Repurchases allow flexibility in the timing of the repurchase and the amount of 
the repurchase.  This flexibility allowed Crown to buy back stock in years when 
investment opportunities were low.  Typically, Crown bought stock when a market maker 
would call the firm with a block of shares to sell.  With willing sellers, Crown could often 
buy the stock at attractive prices, further encouraging manager shareholders to remain 
long-term shareholders.  But when international expansion opportunities presented 
themselves, Crown could defer repurchases, finance investment internally, and avoid the 
transaction costs of external borrowing. While quite different from its competitors’ 
conglomerate strategies popular at the time, Crown’s focused and flexible investment 
strategy greatly rewarded its shareholders over the long-term. 
Managers who do not tender their own shares when conducting a repurchase send 
a strong positive signal to the market.22  Such repurchases are a much more credible 
signal than dividends.  While cash dividends allow managers to diversify their wealth, 
shareholder managers concentrate their wealth in the firm when they do not tender their 
shares during a repurchase program.  Managers will choose repurchases over dividends 
only if they are confident of the firm’s future.  Board insider ownership in Crown was 
generally quite high, averaging 33.7% during the Connelly era and reaching a high of 
60.5% in 1963.  High insider ownership reinforced the signal sent by repurchases.23 
21 Researchers have found that most firms do not maintain a fixed repurchase ratio. For example, Brav, A., 
Graham, J.R., Harvey, C.R., Michaely, R., 2005. Payout policy in the 21st century. Journal of 
Financial Economics 77, 483-527. 
22 For a formal treatment of this effect, see Vermaelen, T., 1984. Repurchase tender offers, signalling and 
managerial incentives. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 19, 163-181. Ofer, A.R., 
Thakor, A.V., 1987. A theory of stock price responses to alternative corporate cash disbursement 
methods: stock repurchases and dividends. Journal of Finance 42, 365-394. 
 
23 We have considered the possibility that Crown used other methods of signaling such as insider 
purchases and projections or revisions of earnings announcements.  Examining the Wall Street Journal 
Index available from 1962-1990, we uncovered only three repurchase announcements, two specific 
announcements of insider purchases, and eight public announcements of favorable earnings revisions and 
projections.  The average two day abnormal returns (calculated with a market adjusted model and CRSP 
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Although Crown did not usually issue formal repurchase announcements, 
repurchases are not as necessary as signals to the market when insiders hold large equity 
stakes.  Shareholders can be more confident that their investment will be fairly valued if 
management periodically repurchases stock when it believes the stock is undervalued.   
Crown repurchased common stock in 26 of the 32 years between 1958 and 1989.  In 19 
of those 26 years, Crown bought its stock at prices less than the average stock price in 
those years.  While the mean average of Crown’s stock prices during those 26 years was 
$36.43, the average repurchase price was only $34.31.   
Finally, by distributing cash through share repurchases rather than dividends 
Crown allowed its stockholders to save on taxes. Shareholders who wanted cash had the 
choice of when to tender their shares, paid tax only on that part of the sales price that 
represented a capital gain (as opposed to dividends that are taxed 100% as ordinary 
income) and then at a lower capital gains tax rate.  Even when Crown repurchased stock, 
shareholders could still choose to hold onto their shares with the expectation of further 
capital gains while continuing to delay paying tax on those gains until the time they 
wished to sell their shares. 
 
Corporate Governance 
One of the benefits of dividends is that they reduce management’s ability to waste free 
cash flow on uneconomic projects and thereby subject management to more capital 
market supervision.  But if a firm is not paying dividends, shareholders must have other 
means of monitoring management and aligning managerial interests with their own. 
Debt capital may also impose greater discipline upon management than equity capital 
would.  In contrast with the flexibility of equity capital and a share repurchase policy, 
debt capital requires principal and interest payments according to a rigid schedule.  But 
Crown’s impressive performance was achieved with limited use of financial leverage. 
Connelly sought to limit the control that banks exercised during Crown’s cash crisis in 
1957, and steadily reduced leverage over time.24  Long-term debt, while financing 22% 
of Crown’s assets in 1960, had been reduced to just 0.9% by 1988.  During Connelly’s 
value weighted index) from these announcements are shown below.  We also considered the possibility that 
Crown relied on the dividend announcements of its competitors (American, Continental, and National Can 
companies) for transmittal of industry wide information to the marketplace.  Using CRSP dividend data, we 
examined the eleven dividend increases that elicited two day abnormal returns higher than 0.015 for the 
respective dividend issuing company.  However, the evidence presented below does not suggest that Crown 
used any of these potential alternative signaling mechanisms. 
 
 Number 2 Day Abnormal Return 
Repurchase announcements 3 0.0109 
Insider purchases 2 -0.0188 
Earnings announcements 8 0.0002 
Competitors’ dividend announcements  11 -0.0034 
 
24 According to a senior officer and board member from the Connelly era, Connelly would circulate 
memos whenever bank debt was retired to congratulate his fellow officers. 
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tenure as CEO, long-term debt financed just over 10% of assets, on average; and if we 
include short-term debt in the calculation, the figure rises to less than 17%.  Crown was a 
net borrower in only 16 of the 33 years from 1957 to 1989; and in all but seven of those 
years, Crown paid out more cash to shareholders through repurchases than it borrowed.   
Hostile takeovers are another way that capital markets act to reduce agency costs. 
But this argument seems largely irrelevant in this case, since the large shareholdings of 
Connelly and other insiders could have been used to block any takeover attempts.  And 
thus, as studies of corporate governance go, Crown is a highly unusual case.  Many 
observers wondered how a firm could limit agency costs without the obligations imposed 
by debt and regular dividend payments. 
Closer inspection shows that Crown achieved effective governance during the 
Connelly years in a variety of ways.  Chief among them were several important 
monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms.  The CEO, other senior officers and the 
board of directors (including a particularly large active investor) were also substantial 
shareholders, creating an incentive structure that encouraged investment of free cash flow 
only in those projects likely to generate adequate returns on capital in the future or to 
repay debt or repurchase shares. 
6.1  Monitoring 
Connelly began to replace Crown’s board of directors as the crisis of 1957 subsided.  
Crown repurchased the stock of the McManus family in 1958 and 1959 and members of 
the family then left the board of directors.  Connelly replaced other members of the board 
as well.  By 1960, only one of the directors from the previous era, Herman Ginsburg, 
remained.  Ginsburg was a dissenter under the earlier regime who had run Crown Cork 
International, the only division that performed well before Connelly.   
Robert Drummond, an investment banker at Francis I. DuPont & Co., had helped 
Connelly become CEO.  As someone who both provided advice and owned a substantial 
equity interest, Drummond was what Harvard Business School professor Michael Jensen 
would approvingly have referred to as an “active investor.” Drummond and his firm held 
34.6% of Crown's common stock in 1963, and their ownership did not fall below 20% 
until the 1970s.    
In Table 1, we present average statistics on Crown’s corporate governance and 
compensation policies over four different periods. The four periods summarize data over 
38 years of Crown’s history. The periods are: pre-Connelly (1952-1956); early Connelly 
(1957-1967); mid-Connelly (1968-1978); and late Connelly (1979-1989). Note that active 
investor ownership was nonexistent during the previous era but rose to 20.6% on average 
during the restructuring of Connelly’s early era.25,26   
25 Louis Yaeger, another outside investor, was elected to the board in the same year as Connelly.  From 
1957-1960, Yaeger held an average of 2.9% of Crown’s shares and his shares are included in the ownership 
by active investors. Also, for five years beginning in 1979, Teledyne, a diversified electronics company, 
took a stake in Crown that grew to 9.1%.  Because the firm did not obtain a seat on the board of directors, 
Teledyne’s shares are not included in the ownership by active investors.  Interestingly enough, Teledyne 
also had a relatively long history of a no cash dividend policy. Eventually, Crown repurchased Teledyne's 
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In addition to Drummond and the DuPont company, other board members also 
maintained substantial financial stakes in Crown’s future.  Of the board members who 
replaced those from the Nagle era, all had stock ownership in Crown.  In total, common 
stock ownership by board members in the early Connelly era averaged 47.7% and never 
fell below 21% during the three Connelly eras (Table 1).  During the early 1960s, 
ownership by board members reached 60%.  It’s important to note, however, that board 
ownership is no guarantee by itself of success since board members owned 27.5% of 
Crown’s stock in the pre-Connelly era. The same can also be said for officers who were 
on the board.  Their ownership was also quite high pre-Connelly and later it ranged from 
20.1% to 27.1% (Table 1). 
Perhaps most remarkable is Connelly’s stake in Crown.  In addition to his own 
share ownership, Connelly also had a personal interest in shares owned by his charitable 
organization, the Connelly Foundation.27  Early in his career, Connelly began 
aggressively purchasing shares of Crown for both his family and the Connelly 
Foundation.  Through the Foundation’s and his own shares, Connelly initially controlled 
3.5% of the firm in 1957.  This interest grew to 25.0% by 1962.  As Connelly neared 
death, he began selling his own shares, but his control through his shares and the 
Foundation’s never fell below 14% (as can be seen in Table 1).  Crown thus resembled an 
owner-operated firm to a substantial degree.  Connelly had much at stake in Crown’s 
success and exerted a great deal of control over its operations.  
The composition of Crown’s board evolved over time.  At first, the company 
needed the discipline of outsiders to correct years of subpar performance.  Outside 
representation on the board was increased from 10% under the Nagle regime to 64% in 
1960.  As shown in Table 1, the proportion of outsiders on Crown’s board during the first 
Connelly era was 43%. 
As the company grew out of the crisis and expanded internationally in the 1960s, 
Connelly increased representation of international officers.  Although the proportional 
representation of outsiders declined due to increased international representation, the 
number of outsiders on the board in most years was six.  As will be discussed later, an 
important element of Crown’s growth strategy was to expand internationally where 
shares in June of 1984 at the then market price of $36/share.  For an examination of Teledyne’s repurchases 
and an analysis of the returns to its security holders from repurchase announcements, see Wansley and 
Fayez (1986). 
26 Denis et al. (1997b) note that managerial ownership may result in entrenched management due to their 
increased power and the reduced probability of takeover.  In the case of Crown, the presence of outside 
blockholders and Connelly’s consistent record of success was a deterrent to takeover activity.  
27 Through his foundation, Connelly made charitable contributions of more than $74 million during his 
lifetime.  Connelly, a devoted Catholic philanthropist, was designated a Gentleman of His Holiness, the 
highest honor given to laypersons outside of Vatican City.  Connelly contributed to Villanova, LaSalle, and 
Thomas Jefferson universities as well as the University of Pennsylvania.   New York Times Obituary, July 
11, 1990, p.A1. 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 
 
competition was not as fierce and profit margins were higher.  By increasing international 
representation on the board, Crown increased information flow from operations abroad.28 
  
6.2  Managerial Compensation 
At Crown, managerial compensation was performance-based, with modest rewards for 
merely average performance.  Connelly’s salary was small compared with executives at 
other can manufacturers.  It never rose above $200,000 during the period 1958 to 1983, 
and was less than a third that of American Can’s or Continental’s chief executives.29  In 
fact, when Connelly began rebuilding Crown in 1958, his salary was only $34,166, as 
compared to the $208,200 paid to American Can’s chief executive. 
But if his salary was modest, Connelly benefited very substantially from his 
ownership in Crown.  Proxy statements from 1957 to 1989 show that his wealth and that 
of his Foundation increased by an average of $10.2 million annually through stock price 
appreciation over the period30—an amount that, over the entire period, was more than 74 
times Connelly’s average salary of $131,415.  In Table 1, the increase in Connelly’s 
equity stake as a multiple of his salary was 74, 56, and 77 during the three Connelly eras. 
This is a marked contrast from the multiple of 2 in the pre-Connelly era. 
At its peak in 1989, the market value of Connelly’s and the Foundation’s common 
stock was $233.5, and the average value of their holdings was 660 times Connelly’s 
salary.  Not only did Connelly himself then have a powerful incentive to reduce operating 
expenses and increase firm profitability, but outside shareholders would have great 
confidence in management despite its no-dividend policy. 
Base salaries for other Crown executives were also comparatively modest.  For 
example, in 1989, the top 20 officers made an average salary of $115,000.  The senior 
vice presidents of finance and sales earned $122,828 and $121,734 in salary, respectively. 
But though their salaries were relatively low, these executives also had substantial 
ownership interests.  In 1989, the six officers below Connelly on the board held $14.7 
million of Crown's common shares.  Their increase in wealth from stock price 
appreciation in that year was $2.2 million, averaging $358,820 per board officer.  Crown 
had an active stock option plan, granting an average 1.14% of annual shares outstanding 
28 The results of Linck et al. (2008) support the hypothesis that board structure is based on the costs and 
benefits of monitoring and advising.  Consistent with the hypothesis that managerial ownership and board 
monitoring are substitutes for one another, they find that high managerial ownership is associated with 
smaller and less independent boards.  Crown’s board structure is somewhat consistent with their results.  
The inclusion of international officers increased the flow of information and resulted in a proportionally 
less independent board. However, Crown’s board grew quite large as international representation grew. 
29 For the years 1958-1983 subperiod, Connelly's average salary was $91,458, compared to $326,784 for 
American CEOs and $297,035 for Continental CEOs.  Complete data for National Can’s CEO was not 
available. 
30 In order to determine his change in wealth from firm performance separate from his purchases of shares, 
this figure is calculated each year as the change in stock price times the previous period's share ownership.   
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to officers in the Connelly era.31  In 1969, the firm established an employee stock 
ownership plan for all employees in which 10% employee purchases were matched by  
25% contributions by the firm.   
One reason Connelly avoided dividends was to motivate management [using 
stock options as well as common shares?].  He thought the best motivation for 
managers would come from a combination of low salaries, stock options, and share price 
appreciation strengthened by a repurchase program.32  When paid with stock options, 
managers will prefer the share price appreciation effect of repurchases to dividends.33  
Over Connelly’s career, Crown repurchased $624 million worth of common shares while 
selling only $186 million worth.  By 1989, the firm had repurchased 63.9% of the shares 
Crown had outstanding in 1957.  Officers owned 22.6% of Crown’s shares on average 
over that era, but this would only have been 16.8% without the share repurchases.  Board 
members owned 33.7% on average over the same period but this would have been only 
26.3% without the share repurchases.  
In addition to the economic incentives he created, Connelly engendered 
managerial loyalty by visiting plant personally and helping them feel proud to be on an 
underdog team that was outperforming larger adversaries.  Connelly promoted only from 
within the company, creating an additional incentive for management to work in Crown’s 
long-term interests.  Pay for performance extended to the plant level.   
 
Crown’s Strategy for Growth in a Mature Industry 
Crown’s industry environment was challenging.  It operated in a low-margin, slow-
growth business.  Its competitors decided to diversify away from the packaging industry. 
By contrast, Crown achieved impressive operating efficiency and returns to shareholders 
by focusing on metal cans and maintaining strict cost controls.  
Crown timed acquisitions to its advantage because internal cash flow was the 
source of funds and it could defer share repurchases when it found attractive investment 
opportunities. And as we discuss below, Crown is an excellent case of large management 
ownership leading to a focused growth strategy and value-increasing capital 
investments.34 
31 In the words of one junior executive, “If John (Connelly) told me to jump out the window, I'd jump - 
and be sure he'd catch me at the bottom with a stock option in his hand.” Fortune, October 1962, p. 163. 
32 Per phone conversation with a senior officer and board member from the Connelly era. 
33 To determine whether Crown timed repurchases to coincide with insider sales, we regress Crown 
repurchases against Crown insider sales using the available annual data from 1964 to 1989.  It results in an 
insignificant slope coefficient and an R-squared of 0.0163.  However, it appears that Crown did repurchase 
stock partially to protect shareholders from dilution.  During this period, Crown insiders sold 1.1 million 
shares while Crown repurchased 15.6 million shares. 
34 For further description and other examples, see Denis, D.J., Denis, D.K., Sarin, A., 1997a. Agency 
problems, equity ownership, and corporate diversification. Journal of Finance 52, 135-160. 
Marchica, M., Mura, R., 2009. Financial flexibility, investment ability and firm value: evidence from 
low leverage firms. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=891562. 
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Interestingly, all three of Crown’s competitors paid cash dividends until their 
eventual end.  National Can never missed a dividend in its last 21 years.  American and 
Continental Can never missed a dividend in their entire 66 and 62 years, respectively.  
And on average, all three competitors used more long-term debt than Crown.  From 
1957-1984, Crown financed 11.7% of assets with long-term debt, as compared to 22.3% 
for the average of its competitors.  In all but four of those 26 years, Crown carried less 
long-term debt than its average competitor. 
7.1  Conditions in the Metal Can Industry 
During the 1960s, metal cans became Crown’s primary business.  By 1974, crowns and 
cans constituted 3.3% and 59.4% of domestic sales, respectively.35  However, the metal 
can industry was a slow growth industry with low margins where the threat of self-
manufacture by beverage companies was always present.  This was partly because the 
expense of transporting metal cans put outside suppliers at a competitive disadvantage.  
As Figure 4 illustrates, the share of the metal can market devoted to self-manufacture 
grew from 13% in 1955 to 24% in 1988, and reached a high of 34% in 1982.36  Plastic 
containers posed another threat to Crown.  Plastic bottles became more popular partly 
because of their light weight and shatter-resistance.  Figure 5 shows how demand for 
plastic containers grew faster than for metal cans.  Lastly, aluminum cans threatened steel 
cans.  Traditionally, metal can manufacturers preferred steel for its low cost.  But by the 
early 1970s, aluminum cans had become much more popular.  The major aluminum 
producers, Reynolds Metals and Alcoa, also made most of the aluminum cans.  
Aluminum had several advantages over steel.  It was lighter (less than half the weight of 
steel) and cost less to transport.  And it was also easier to lithograph, did not have a 
flavoring problem like steel cans, and was more easily and economically recycled. 
Though metal cans were predominantly still made of steel in 1970, aluminum had the 
largest market share (Figure 6) by 1988.  In 1989, aluminum had 99% of the beer can 
market and 94% of the soft drink can market.37 
These competitive pressures led to what Standard and Poor’s Industry Survey referred to 
as “the chronic overcapacity that plagued the industry in the late 1960s and early 
1970.”38  Industry analysts estimated overcapacity at 30% in 1973 and more than 20% in 
1981.39 
7.2 The Response of Crown’s competitors 
35 “Crown Cork and Seal Company, Inc.,” HBS Case Services No. 378-024, Harvard Business School. 
36 Sources:  “Crown Cork and Seal Company and the Metal Container Industry,” HBS Case Services No. 
373-077, Harvard Business School; Standard and Poor’s Industry Surveys 1961-1980; and “Crown Cork 
and Seal in 1989,” HBS Case Services No. 9-793-035, Harvard Business School. 
37 “Crown Cork and Seal in 1989,” HBS Case Services No. 9-793-035, Harvard Business School, p. 4. 
38 Standard and Poor’s Industry Survey, 1974, p. C107. 
39 Standard and Poor’s Industry Survey, 1973, p. C62; Standard and Poor’s Industry Survey, 1982, C104. 
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Researchers have found that companies that make bad (including overprice) acquisitions 
significantly increase the odds that they become the next takeover targets.40  That was 
especially true in the metal can industry.  Crown’s three competitors all pursued 
conglomerate diversification strategies without success and were eventually acquired by 
other companies.   
The smallest competitor in 1956 was the National Can Company.  Initially, 
National stayed fairly close to its core business with sales from both metal cans and 
housewares.  Nevertheless, the firm later diversified into food products and pet foods 
starting in 1967 and experienced financial trouble by 1975.  By this time, many Wall 
Street analysts urged management to sell off its pet food products, but the company held 
onto these businesses until 1979.  Ultimately, Triangle Industries acquired National in 
April of 1985. 
In 1956, American Can sold metal cans, metal goods, and related machinery areas 
and had nearly nine times the sales of Crown.  Even so, American diversified itself into a 
conglomerate even more aggressively than National did.  By 1986, the firm was selling 
products ranging from dress patterns to biomedical equipment and had entered financial 
services and retailing.  American then changed its name to Primerica to reflect its 
diversification into financial services.  American was one of the first companies to pay 
greenmail in the 1980s.  The firm repurchased shares from a group led by Carl Icahn in 
August of 1982 and divested its paper products business by 1983.  Eventually, Primerica 
also sold its metal can business to Triangle Industries in 1986.  Later, Triangle sold both 
National and American Can to Pechiney, an aluminum concern owned partially by the 
French government. 
Crown’s largest competitor in 1956 was the Continental Can Company.  It sold 
metal cans, closures, and paper and glass containers but later also diversified into 
financial services and unrelated areas such as soy protein products and sausage casings.  
Continental bought the Quartite Creative Corporation, a manufacturer of lamps and home 
furnishings.  When selling cans, Continental concentrated on volume, not margins, but its 
operations were notoriously inefficient. After a leveraged buyout failed to turn the 
company around, it was acquired in 1984 by the Nebraska firm, Peter Kiewit Sons.   
Crown became the largest can manufacturer in Canada (65% of the Canadian 
market) in 1989 after buying the Canadian operations of Continental.  This gave it some 
pricing power and high margins, while tariffs protected it from competition.  Crown had 
paid only eight times operating profits, as compared to the ten times operating profit 
Pechiney paid for Triangle Industries’ American National Can Company. 
In 1990, Crown went on to purchase the U.S. operations of Continental from Peter 
Kiewit.41  Because the former Continental staff were poorly motivated and operations 
40 See for example, Mitchell, M.L., Lehn, K., 1990. Do bad bidders become good targets? Journal of 
Political Economy 98, 372-398. 
41 Some analysts believe Kiewit lost $50 million on the sale. Ibid. 
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were inefficient, the gains to Crown would have to come from changing the 
compensation structure and performance of its managers to resemble Crown’s.42 
Analysts estimated that Crown could easily save $25-30 million in operating expenses 
and an additional $60 million if it shut down four of Continental’s plants. These 
purchases also made Crown the world’s largest buyer of aluminum, giving it bargaining 
power with aluminum suppliers.  (In the 1960s, its interesting to note, Crown had 
hesitated to abandon tin cans for aluminum because it was afraid of the oligopolistic 
power of aluminum suppliers.)   
7.3  Crown’s Strategy  
Rather than follow its competitors into unrelated businesses, Crown expanded 
internationally in the same industry and specialized in products not vulnerable to self-
manufacture by beer and soda companies.  Figure 7 presents a graphical representation of 
the acquisition strategies in the metal can industry.  At one extreme, American Can made 
81% of its acquisitions in unrelated areas while Crown made all of its acquisitions within 
its core business of containers and packaging.  Crown was the only major metal can 
manufacturer that did not expand outside the packaging industry.  Connelly believed that 
by staying within its core business, Crown could concentrate on business it had expertise 
in and rely on homegrown instead of outside executives.43   
Some financial professionals have advised companies to acquire private firms or 
divisions of public firms rather than entire public firms.44  The argument is that without a 
stock price to serve as a starting point for negotiations, a buyer is more likely to avoid 
competitive bidding situations.  The same advisors also recommend that acquisitions be 
within the acquirer’s core.  Under Connelly, Crown typically bought privately held firms 
or parts of publicly held businesses.   
Crown management believed that increased living standards and population 
growth would result in much higher growth abroad than in the U.S.  In 1960, Connelly 
established a program to build plants overseas and twelve years later the company had 33 
plants in lesser developed countries. By 1989, foreign plants contributed 62% of the 
firm’s pre-tax profits.  For the 13 years (of available data) from 1977-1989, pre-tax 
profits grew by 0.1% in the U.S. compared to 10.6% and 8.7% in Europe and lesser 
developed countries, respectively.  Crown’s international expansion was in keeping with 
its emphasis on cost efficiency and margins, as international profit margins were typically 
42 According to William Avery, Connelly's successor in the president's chair:  "The success of the 
individual managers are linked to the success of the company (Crown) as a whole," Avery explains.  "At 
Continental, the managers were, for the most part, professional managers, excellent in quality but perhaps 
lacking the same devotion as many of the Crown people.  A major portion of our earnings came from the 
gain in stock, whereas the Continental employees were basically salaried.  So when we restructured the 
company, everyone from a plant manager up within this organization was offered stock options.  In so 
doing we are trying to get the managers to look at their roles as owner-operators, which is a lot different 
from being a professional manager."  Beverage World, February 1992, p. 66. 
43 Per phone conversation with a senior officer and board member from the Connelly era. 
44 Copeland, T., Koller, T., Murin, J., 2000. Mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures. Valuation: 
Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies 3, Ch.7. Wiley. New York, NY. 
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higher than domestic profit margins.  From 1977-1989, pre-tax profit margins averaged 
8.8% in the U.S. versus 10.3% overseas. 
Connelly insisted on tight control of foreign operations and traveled extensively 
to monitor operations.  He was reluctant to relinquish power to other partners and did not 
enter Japan because that would have required taking on a foreign partner (by contrast, 
Nagle shared ownership of foreign plants with overseas investors).  Under Connelly, 
Crown purchased the 41% of Crown International not already owned.  Crown’s usual 
approach was to staff its foreign plants with foreign national managers and equip them 
with old machinery removed from its U.S. plants.  Frequently, the company would secure 
exclusive manufacturing rights (referred to as pioneer rights) and ten-year tax breaks 
from host governments in the initial stages of operation.   
Crown emphasized high-margin items that required difficult manufacture and 
shunned low margin items sold in more competitive markets.  For example, despite its 
50% market share in metal oil cans, Crown did not expand into composite paper and 
metal cans because they thought paper companies had an advantage in this new, low 
margin product.  Connelly insisted on a payback of two years for all investments and said 
that “sales without profits were meaningless.”  During Connelly’s tenure, pre-tax profits 
grew at an average rate of 18.0% while sales grew at a rate of 9.6%. 
To meet the challenge from the aluminum can market and respond to fears of lead 
migration in metal cans, Crown developed a two-pieced steel can without a lead seam.  In 
1972, two-piece cans had 8.8% of the soft drink market.  By 1988, two-piece cans had 
replaced three-piece cans entirely.  Though Crown eventually moved from steel to 
aluminum cans in the early 1980s, Connelly shunned aluminum for many years because 
its high cost resulted in low profit margins. 
To prevent the loss of business due to self-manufacture, Crown emphasized 
customer service.  Whereas earlier the company had built a Leeds, Alabama plant so that 
it could be closer to its suppliers, Connelly shut down that plant and moved operations to 
Atlanta so that it could better serve its customers.  Crown located plants close to its 
customers so that it could provide timely delivery of inventory, providing just-in-time 
inventory service before the term became popular.  The company also designed printers 
for cans that allowed for rapid changeover to facilitate this service. 
By necessity, cost controls were of primary concern at Crown as aluminum 
accounted for 65% of the cost of a can, and Crown’s customers were large companies 
that did not accept price increases readily.  The boardroom was inexpensively furnished 
and separated from the secretary's office by folding wooden dividers.  Annual reports 
were sparsely decorated, with few glossy photographs.45  As a result of the firm’s efforts, 
Crown’s operating profit margin exceeded its competitors for most of Connelly’s tenure 
(Figure 2).   
45 Crown’s operating efficiency won praise from Peter Lynch in his book “Beating the Street.” The 
absence of glossy photographs in Crown’s annual report led Lynch to declare the following principle of 
investing.  He states: “This piddling level of expenditure, bordering on the monastic, was inspired by John 
Connelly, the CEO, who recently died.  Connelly’s hostility to extravagance brings us to Peter’s Principle 
#17:  All else equal, invest in the company with the fewest color photographs in the annual report.” 
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7.4  The Results of Crown’s Strategy  
Connelly slashed operating expenses to bring Crown out of its liquidity crisis.  As the 
crisis subsided, Connelly continued to reduce spending on perquisites and unnecessary 
capital expenditure.  Inventory turnover improved, productivity increased, and selling, 
general, and administrative expenses were brought down to the lowest level in the 
industry.  Before Connelly’s takeover in 1956, the company’s operating expenses were 
13.5% of sales.  By fiscal year 1983, Crown's operating expenses had been lowered to 
3.3%.  In contrast, for Crown's three main competitors, American, Continental, and 
National can companies, operating expenses grew from 4.9% to 8.8% over the same time 
period.   
In keeping with Connelly's emphasis on high margin sales, Crown's gross profit 
margin averaged 18.5% over 1957-1983 compared to its competitors’ 15.4%.  More 
impressive though is the steady rise in Crown’s net profits and the company’s subsequent 
domination of its competitors in this area.  From a near zero net profit margin in 1956, 
Crown’s margin subsequently surpassed its competitors’ average of 2.3% in 1960 and 
climbed as high as 6.0% in the 1970’s.  On average, Crown’s net profit margin was 4.6% 
compared to its competitors’ 3.2% during 1957-1983.  During Connelly’s entire tenure, 
the firm never experienced a quarterly loss. 
Crown’s average return on assets and equity were also impressive.  As a result of 
Crown’s operating efficiencies and emphasis on products with higher margins, Crown’s 
average return on assets was 6.1% while its competitors’ was 4.8% during 1957-1983.  
Operationinng efficiencies and share repurchases drove Crown’s returns on equity higher.  
Its average return on equity was 11.5% compared with 10.1% for its competitors, in the 
period 1957-1983.   
Crown was a success by traditional accounting measures but Crown shareholders 
enjoyed even more remarkable returns.  In Figure 1 earlier we saw the superiority of 
Crown’s risk-adjusted returns to its competitors’ in the can and bottle industry during the 
Connelly era.  Figure 8 shows the geometric average return for Crown stockholders and 
its competitors over the period May 1957 to June 1984.  Crown shareholders enjoyed 
16.4% annual returns, as compared to 6.4% at American Can Company and 10.7% for 
Continental and National Can.  The company that diversified the most outside of its core 
business, American Can, had the lowest stock returns while Crown had the highest.  The 
returns for the S&P 500 was 4.6%. 
Whether one uses accounting or shareholder return figures, Crown’s record far 
exceeded that of its competitors.  Crown went from a liquidity crisis in 1957 to leadership 
of the U.S. and Canadian metal can industry by 1990.  And the company’s international 
and core growth strategies were superior to that of the conglomerate diversification 
strategies pursued by its competitors. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
The record of Crown Cork and Seal under John Connelly provides a clear demonstration 
of a mature company’s success in a slow-growth industry while making use of a flexible 
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payout policy.  As the case suggests, under certain circumstances, and with effective 
governance mechanisms in place, stock repurchases can substitute for cash dividends 
while providing financial flexibility, reducing asymmetric information asymmetries, and 
providing tax savings to shareholders.  Crown’s payout policy also complemented its 
compensation policy by increasing management’s equity stake and further aligning their 
interests with external shareholders.  At the same time, substantial board and 
management equity ownership showed faith in the firm and signaled confidence in the 
market value.  Crown kept debt low and used internal cash to fund investments that 
resulted in a focused, international growth strategy and operational efficiencies.  The 
returns to Crown shareholders exceeded that of investment benchmarks and its 
competitors. 
By contrast, Crown’s competitors used much more debt and paid out regular 
dividends to their shareholders.  Faced with slower growth, they pursued diversification 
strategies that ended up destroying value.  What is not clear, and is perhaps an area for 
future research, is whether their payout policy influenced their investment policy.  In 
other words, was the requirement for stable cash flow that stemmed from their payout 
policy also an impetus for their diversification across industries?   
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Figure 1.  Abnormal stock price performance index for Crown Cork and Seal and an industry portfolio 
from January 1940 to December 1990. 
 
The abnormal stock price performance index is calculated monthly as in Baker (1992) and Wruck (1994) 
where the cumulative actual return is scaled by the cumulative expected return.  In the absence of abnormal 
returns, this index will equal one.  Expected returns are calculated on a rolling basis using the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model.  Intercept and slope coefficients are calculated using the prior 36 months of data.  The 30 
day T-bill rate serves as the risk free rate and the S&P 500 return is used to proxy for the market return.  
The industry portfolio is the equally weighted average abnormal performance index of ten other can and 
bottle manufacturers:  American Can, Anchor Glass, Ball, Clark Manufacturing, Continental Can, Heekin 
Can, Kerr Glass, National Can, Owens Illinois, and Van Dorn. 
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Figure 2.  Operating profits scaled by sales for Crown Cork and Seal and an industry portfolio from 1947 to 
1990. 
 
The operating profits for the industry is from an equally weighted portfolio of ten other can and bottle 
manufacturers:  American Can, Anchor Glass, Ball, Clark Manufacturing, Continental Can, Heekin Can, 
Kerr Glass, National Can, Owens Illinois, and Van Dorn.  Sources:  Standard and Poor’s Compustat, 
Moody’s Industrial Manual, and Crown Cork and Seal Annual Reports. 
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Figure 3.  Cash used for common and preferred stock repurchases as a percent of operating cash flow for Crown 
Cork and Seal from 1957 to 1990.  Source: Crown Cork and Seal Annual Reports. 
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Figure 4.  Percent of metal cans self manufactured from 1955 to 1988. 
 
The percent of cans self manufactured measures the percentage of metal cans manufactured by food and 
beverage companies for their own use.  A larger percentage of self manufactured cans corresponds to a 
lower percentage of cans purchased from metal can companies, such as Crown Cork and Seal.  Source: 
“Crown Cork and Seal Company and the Metal Container Industry,” HBS Case Services No. 373-077, 
Harvard Business School; Standard and Poor’s Industry Surveys 1981-1988; “Crown Cork and Seal in 
1989,” HBS Case Services No. 9-793-035, Harvard Business School. 
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Figure 5.  Growth in production of metal cans and plastic bottles from 1954 to 1990. 
 
To examine the relative growth of metal cans and plastic bottles, the data series of the value of shipments 
for each container is indexed where the base year is 1954=100.   Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
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Figure 6.  Share of metal cans manufactured with aluminum and steel from 1970 to 1994. 
 
Source: “Crown Cork and Seal Company, Inc.,” HBS Case Services No. 378-024, Harvard Business 
School; “Crown Cork and Seal in 1989,” HBS Case Services No. 9-793-035, Harvard Business School; 
Can Manufacturers Institute.   
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Figure 7.  Acquisitions by firms in the metal can industry. 
 
For each of the four firms in the metal can industry, the number of acquisitions within the packaging and 
container industry and outside the industry are recorded from Moody’s Industrial Manual.  The time period 
is from 1957 (Connelly’s first year as CEO) to 1984 (The year data for Crown’s primary competitors in the 
metal can industry started becoming unavailable as its competitors either went private or were acquired by 
other firms). 
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Figure 8.  Geometric mean returns for firms in the metal can industry and investment benchmarks. 
 
The returns are from CRSP. The time period is from May 1957 (Connelly’s first year as CEO) to June 1984 
(The month data for Crown’s primary competitors in the metal can industry started becoming unavailable 
as its competitors either went private or were acquired by other firms). 
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Table 1 
Board Composition, Ownership, and Executive Compensation Statistics 
 
 
 Pre- 
Connelly 
Early 
Connelly 
Mid- 
Connelly 
Late- 
Connelly 
     
Board Composition     
% Outsiders  10% 43% 37% 42% 
% U.S. Insiders 90% 39% 37% 44% 
% International                                
Insiders 
0% 18% 26% 14% 
     
Average number of total board 
members 
 
10.0 13.7 16.6 15.8 
Equity Ownership     
Active Investor Ownership 
 
0% 20.6% 12.4% 0% 
Board Ownership 27.5% 47.7% 32.5% 21.0% 
     
Officer Ownership 27.5% 27.1% 20.1% 20.6% 
     
Connelly Ownership 0% 18.7% 18.4% 16.0% 
     
Compensation     
Increase in wealth from CEO’s 
equity stake as a multiple of 
CEO’s salary 
-2 74 56 77 
     
 
The above table provides averages for board composition, ownership, and executive compensation 
statistics. The analysis is partitioned as follows:  
pre-Connelly era  1952-1956 
early Connelly era 1957-1967 
mid-Connelly era  1968-1978 
late Connelly era  1979-1989. 
 
Board composition statistics provide the average number of outsiders and insiders serving on Crown’s 
board for the era examined where current and retired officers are categorized as insiders and non-officers 
and outside counsel are categorized as outsiders.  Crown acquired several foreign can manufacturers and 
many of the former owners gained representation on Crown’s board, hence the large number of 
international insiders on Crown’s board. The average number of board members is also reported by era.  
The source of this information is Crown’s annual proxy statements. 
 
Active investor ownership reports the average stock ownership by investors who had beneficial ownership 
of more than 1% of Crown’s outstanding shares, as reported in the annual proxy statements.  Board 
ownership is the average percent of shares owned by all board members.  Officer ownership reflects the 
ownership for officers also on the board, and thus potentially understates total officer ownership. 
Consistent with Jensen and Murphy (1990), the figures above also include shares where the board member 
or officer serves as a trustee. 
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To gauge the sensitivity of Crown’s compensation policy to that of the firm’s performance through time, 
the compensation statistic measures the average yearly increase in wealth from the CEO’s share ownership 
scaled by the CEO’s salary.  A larger number (in absolute value) indicates that the CEO’s compensation is 
more sensitive to changes in stockholder wealth. The increase in wealth is calculated as the rate of return on 
the firm’s stock multiplied by the CEO’s beginning of the year stock wealth.  Consistent with Jensen and 
Murphy (1990), this measure includes wealth from shares where the CEO serves as a trustee. The source of 
this information is Crown’s annual proxy statements and the CRSP database. 
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Appendix A: A Brief History of Crown Holdings Incorporated 
 
1892 The Crown Cork and Seal Company is founded by William Painter. 
1927 Charles McManus Sr. assumes leadership of Crown after merging his company 
with Crown. 
1936 Crown branches outside of closures and begins production of tin cans with 
purchase of Acme Can Company. 
1946 Charles McManus Sr. dies and his secretary John Nagle becomes the president 
and chairman of the board. 
1953 Crown's corporate structure is changed in an attempt to revive the company, but 
results in a top heavy organization.   
1954 Crown's profit margin falls to 2% as operating expenses climb to 13%. 
1955 Connelly begins buying stock. 
1956 Connelly is elected to the board. 
1957 Connelly ascends to the presidency and begins restructuring.  He eliminates all 
short-term debt by year end. 
1960 Crown establishes a program to build plants overseas. 
1963 Crown remains only major can company producing solely metal containers as 
competitors pursue conglomerate diversification strategies. 
1970 All preferred stock is retired. 
1977 Crown reaches $1 billion in sales and has 60 foreign plants. 
1980 Crown begins production of aluminum cans. 
1981 William Avery succeeds Connelly as President.  
1989 William Avery succeeds Connelly as CEO.  Crown embarks on an ambitious 
acquisition program.  Crown purchases the Canadian can operations of 
Continental Can and Crown becomes the largest can manufacturer in Canada.   
1990 William Avery replaces Connelly as Chairman of the Board.  Connelly dies later 
in the year.  Crown purchases the U.S. operations of Continental Can.   
1992 Crown makes its first entry into plastic packaging, acquiring CONSTAR 
International. 
 
1996 Crown merges with CarnaudMetalbox and becomes the largest packaging firm in 
the world. The firm initiates a quarterly dividend of 25 cents a share. 
2000 Crown’s stock price is at a 15 year low.  
2001 Crown suspends its cash dividend. John Conway takes over as CEO from William 
Avery.  
2002 Crown sells its position in Constar. 
005 Crown sells its Plastic Closures business. 
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Appendix B:  Crown in the post-Connelly era 
Connelly remained chairman of the board until early 1990 and died in July 1990 at age 
85.46  A 30 year veteran of Crown who had started as a management trainee, William 
Avery decided that the firm needed to diversify beyond its core metal can business.  
Avery’s strategy was to undertake an active acquisition and joint venture campaign that 
also moved the firm into plastic packaging.   
From 1989 to 1997, Crown undertook 22 acquisitions, spending over $5 billion.  A 
mergers and acquisitions expert from Salomon Brothers, Craig Calle, was hired as 
treasurer in 1991.  In 1992, Crown purchased Constar International for $615 million, its 
first acquisition in the plastic packaging industry and its first acquisition of a public firm.  
Van Dorn, a metal and packaging firm was bought in 1993 for $177 million in stock and 
cash.  Crown doubled its size with the acquisition of Continental Can in 1990.  It doubled 
its size again to $9 billion in sales with the $4 billion merger with publicly held, metal 
and plastic packaging concern Carnaud Metalbox (CMB) in 1996.  In the two years from 
1991 to 1993, Crown had increased its presence in plastic packaging from zero in sales to 
$1 billion.47    
Crown was aggressive in its acquisitions and paid high price multiples for some.  Constar 
was bought at 25 times earnings.  The Van Dorn purchase came after a long proxy fight 
where Crown increased its price several times and was finally bought at 46 times 
earnings.  Also, as part of the merger agreement, Crown agreed to pay the cash dividend 
that CMB shareholders had previously received.  French law favored the payment of 
dividends and CMB shareholders were expected to demand an all cash acquisition if 
Crown did not initiate a dividend payment.   
Initially, Crown’s stock performed strongly under Avery, growing by 16.4% a year from 
May 1989 to May 1997, compared to 15.9% for the S&P 500.  But the latter part of his 
tenure was not as successful.  From May 1997 to December 2000, its stock fell by 39.7% 
a year, and as a result Crown was worth less than one-fifth of what it had paid for CMB.  
During the same period, the S&P 500 grew by 16.2% annually.  The company’s decline 
was attributed to an increasingly competitive environment, a downturn in business, and 
consolidation in its customer base.  Furthermore, in 1995, Alcoa and other aluminum 
manufacturers raised prices by 50%.48  In Europe, two of its competitors combined forces 
and cut prices, so that Crown’s operations from its CMB purchase created a drag on 
performance.  The firm was forced to sell assets to meet its massive debt service, much of 
which had been assumed for the CMB acquisition.   From 1988 to 2000, the firm’s long-
term debt-to-capital ratio had grown from 0.9% to 45% while selling and administrative 
expenses relative to sales grew 2.8% to 4.3%.  By year end 2001, Crown’s share of the 
beverage can industry had fallen from 26% to 15% and S&P had downgraded its debt to 
junk status. 
46 From Avery's promotion in 1981 until Connelly's death, Connelly continued to sign the annual report 
with Avery's signature beneath his.   
47 Global Finance, March 1997, p. 39; The Philadelphia Inquirer, November 15, 2000, p. C1.  
48 Financial World, December 5, 1995, p.22. 
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With Crown’s stock at a 15 year low, Crown announced Avery’s retirement as CEO in 
November 2000 and he stepped down the following January.  He retired as chairman in 
April 2001.  By late December 2001, Crown, Cork, and Seal’s stock sold for less than 
$1.00.   
It is difficult however to blame Crown management entirely for its troubles.  As noted 
above, external forces also worked against the firm.  Furthermore, the firm had a 
substantial asbestos exposure from a previous acquisition. In 1963, Crown paid $7 
million to acquire the Mundet Cork Company, which had a small insulation operation 
utilizing asbestos.  Mundet’s insulation business was quickly sold within three months of 
the acquisition.  Although Crown had never sold or manufactured asbestos, it was held 
liable for more than 70,000 asbestos claims49 and would pay more than $350 million in 
asbestos related payments by 2002.50  Asbestos related payments would continue to rise 
to $445 million by 2004.51  Concerns over asbestos liability would eventually be cited as 
the reason that Crown suspended common dividends to preserve $126 million in cash 
annually.52   
As noted above, Crown ended its no dividend policy with the acquisition of CMB.  In 
addition, although the firm still repurchased its stock, common repurchases declined 
relative to that under Connelly.  Under Connelly, 31% of operating cash flow had been 
used for repurchases; under Avery this declined to 19%.  Likewise, the payout yield from 
common stock repurchases dropped from an annual average of 4.71% to 1.82%.  
Interestingly, Avery had much less equity at stake than Connelly.  As noted above, 
Connelly’s interest in Crown ranged from 14% to 25%.  In contrast, prior to 1996, 
Avery’s holdings in Crown were never more than 1%.   
In January 2001, John Conway took over as CEO.  Conway began selling off assets, 
including Constar in 2002, and became more focused on its core metal can 
manufacturing.  In 2005, the firm sold its plastic closure business, which had 29 facilities 
in 13 countries.  By 2006 the firm had exited the plastic packaging business and focused 
back on high margin products in developed and emerging markets.  The firm restructured 
its debt through a junk bond offering in 200353 and lowered its debt load from $5.0 
billion in 2000 to $3.4 billion by 2007.   
Under Conway, the firm’s repurchases in 2006-2007 resulted in a payout yield of 3.8%.  
Additionally, from January 2001 to December 2007, Crown’s stock rose by 19.3% 
annually compared to 3.3% for the S&P 500.  Although much larger than the company 
Connelly left in 1989, the recovery follows much of the recipe initiated by Connelly in 
1957: a focus on efficiency and its core business; a reduction in debt; no common 
dividends; and stock repurchases.54  
49 Forbes, June 11, 2001, p. 54. 
50 Knight Ridder Tribune Business News, March 7, 2006, p. 1.  
51 The Philadelphia Inquirer, February 6, 2004, p. 1. 
52 The Wall Street Journal, December 18, 2000, p. B6. 
53 Philadelphia Business Journal, March 4, 2003, p. 1. 
54 The Philadelphia Inquirer, August 25, 2005, p. 1. 
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Abstract 
 
This study shows the payment of cash dividends is not necessary for successful corporate 
financial management in mature firms. A mature company in a mature industry, the 
Crown Cork and Seal Company did not pay any common dividends over a 33-year 
period. Instead, the firm used stock repurchases flexibly to manage the challenges of 
declining industry growth potential.  Crown’s share repurchases increased the 
proportionate equity stakes of board and management members. The high equity 
ownership of insiders served as a strong signal of management’s confidence in the firm.  
The result of these policies was a focused acquisition strategy funded by internally 
generated cash that outperformed its peers’ diversification strategies. 
 
